Academic Articles on Executive Compensation
Abowd, J. (1990), Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? Industrial & Labor Relations Review 43(3): 53-73.
Abowd, J. & M. Bognanno (1995), International differences in executive and managerial compensation in R. Feeman & L. Katz, ed., Differences and Changes in Wage Structures , Chicago: University of Chicago press.
Agrawal, A. & R. Walkling (1994), Executive careers and compensation surrounding takeover bids. Journal of Finance 42(4): 823-37.
Angel, P. & V. Fumas (1997), The compensation of Spanish executives: A test of a managerial talent allocation model. International Journal of Industrial Organisation 15(4): 511-531.
Antle, R. & A. Smith (1986), An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research 24(1): 1-39.
Baiman, S. & R. Verrecchia (1995), Earnings and price-based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting. Journal of Accounting & Economics 20(1): 93-121.
Baker, G., M. Jensen & K. Murphy (1988), Compensation and incentives: practice vs. theory. Journal of Finance 43(3): 593-616.
Baker, G. (1992), Incentive contracts and performance measurement . Journal of Political Economy 100: 598-614.
Barro, R. & J. Barro (1990), Pay, performance and turnover of bank CEOs . Journal of Labor Economics 8(4): 448-481.
Bizjak, J., J. Brickley & J. Coles (1993), Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behavior. Journal of Accounting & Economics 16(1-3): 349-72.
Boschen, J. & K. Smith (1995), You can pay me now and you can pay me later: The dynamic response of executive compensation to firm performance. Journal of Business 68(4): 577-608.
Brickley, J., S. Bhagat & R. Lease (1985), The impact of long-range managerial compensation plans on shareholder wealth. Journal of Accounting & Economics 7(1-3): 115-29.
Bushman R. & R. Indjejikian (1993), Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation. Journal of Accounting & Economics 16(1-3) 3-23.
Bushman R., R. Indjejikian & A. Smith (1996) CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting & Economics 21(2): 161-193.
Campbell, T., Y. Chan & A. Marino (1989), Incentive contracts for managers who discover and manage investment projects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organisations 12: 353-364.
Carpenter, J. (1998), The exercise and valuation of executive stock options . Journal of Financial Economics 48(2): 127-158.
Ciscel, D. & T. Carrol (1980), The determinants of executive salaries: an econometric survey. Review of Economics & Statistics 62(1): 7-13.
Conyon, M. (1997), Corporate governance and executive compensation . International Journal of Industrial Organisation 15(4): 493-510.
Conyon, M., P. Gregg & S. Machin (1995), Taking care of business: executive compensation in the UK. Economic Journal 105: 704-714.
Conyon, M. & K. Murphy (1999), The prince and the pauper? CEP pay in the US and UK. Economic Journal forthcoming.
Conyon, M. & S. Peck (1998), Board control, remuneration committees and top management compensation. Academy of Management Review 41: 146-157.
Conyon, M. & J. Schwalbach (1999), Corporate governance, executive pay and performance in Europe, in J. Carpenter & D. Yermack eds ., Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
Cosh. A. (1975), The remuneration of chief executives in the United Kingdom. Economic Journal 85: 75-94.
Cosh, A. & A. Hughes (1997), Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and institutional shareholdings. International Journal of Industrial Organisation 15(4): 469-492.
Coughlan, A. & R. Schmidt (1985), Executive compensation, management turnover and firm performance. Journal of Accounting & Economics 7(1-3): 43-66.
Cowherd, D. & D. Levine (1992), Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management: An investigation of distributive justice theory. Administrative Science Quarterly 37: 302-320.
Crawford, A., J. Ezzell & J. Miles (1995), Bank CEO pay-performance relations and the effects of deregulation. Journal of Business 68(2).
Crystal G. & F. Foulkes (1998), Don’t bail out underwater options. Fortune March 14.
Dechow, P. and R. Sloan (1991), Executive incentives and the horizon problem . Journal of Accounting & Economics 14(1): 51-89.
Dechow, P., M. Huson & R. Sloan (1994), The effect of restructuring charges on executives’ cash compensation. The Accounting Review 69(1): 138-56.
DeFusco, R., R. Johnson & T. Zorn (1990), The effect of executive option plans on stockholders and bondholders. Journal of Finance 45(2): 617-627.
Dial, J. and K. Murphy (1995), Incentives, downsizing and value creation at General Dynamics. Journal of Financial Economics 37(3): 261-314.
Dye, R. (1984) Relative performance evaluation and project selection . Journal of Accounting Research 30(1): 27-52.
Ezzamel, M. & R. Watson (1998), Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of executive cash compensation: Evidence from the UK. Academy of Management Review 41: 221-231.
Garen, J. (1994), Executive compensation and principal-agent theory . Journal of Political Economy 102(6): 1175-1199.
Gaver, J., K. Gaver & J. Austin (1995), Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management. Journal of Accounting & Economics 19(1): 3-28.
Gibbons, R. (1997), Incentives and careers in organisations, in D. Kreps & K. Wallis eds. Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics , Cambridge University Press.
Gibbons, R. & K. Murphy (1990), Relative performance evaluation for CEOs . Industrial & Labor Relations Review 43(3): 30-51.
Gibbons, R. & K. Murphy (1992), Does executive investment affect investment ? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5(2):
Gibbons, R. & K. Murphy (1992), Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy 100(3): 468-505.
Gilson, S. & M. Vetsuypens (1993), CEO compensation in financially distressed firms: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 48(2): 425-58.
Gregg, P., S. Machin and S. Szymanski (1993), The disappearing relationship between directors’ pay and corporate performance. British Journal of Industrial Relations 31: 1-10.
Hadlock, C. & G. Lumar (1997) Compensation, turnover and top management incentives: Historical evidence. Journal of Business 70: 153-187.
Hall, B. & K. Murphy, (2000). Optimal exercise prices for executive options. The American Economic Review , forthcoming.
Hallock, K. & K. Murphy (1999) The Economics of Executive Compensation . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Haubrich, J. (1994), Risk aversion, performance pay and the principal agent problem . Journal of Political Economy 102(2): 258-76.
Healy, P. (1985), The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions . Journal of Accounting & Economics 7: 85-107.
Hebner, K. & T. Kato (1997), Insider trading and executive compensation: evidence from the US and Japan. International Review of Economics & Finance 6(3): 223-37.
Hemmer, T., S. Matsunaga & T. Shevlin (1998), Optimal exercise and the cost of granting employee stock options with a reload provision. Journal of Accounting Research xxx
Holthausen, R., D. Larcker & R. Sloan (1995), Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics 19(1): 29-74.
Holthausen, R., D. Larcker & R. Sloan (1995), Business unit innovation and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting & Economics 19(2-3): 279-313.
Hubbard, R. & D. Palia (1995), Executive pay and performance: Evidence from the US banking industry. Journal of Financial Economics 39(1): 105-30.
Janakiraman, S., R. Lambert & D. Larcker (1992), An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30(1): 53-69.
Jensen, M. (1993), The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48(3): 831-857.
Jensen, M. & K. Murphy (1990), Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98(2): 225-64.
John, T. & K. John (1993), Top-management compensation and capital structure . Journal of Finance 48(3): 949-74.
Jones, D. & T. Kato (1996), The determinants of CEO compensation in transitional economies: evidence from Bulgaria. Labour Economics 3(3): 319-336.
Joskow, P., N. Rose & C. Wolfram (1996), Political constraints on executive compensation: Evidence from the electric utility industry. Rand Journal of Economics 27(1): 165-82.
Kang, J. & A. Shivdasani (1995), Firm performance, corporate governance and top executive turnover in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 38(1): 29-58.
Kaplan, R. & Norton (1992), The balanced scorecard: measures that drive performance. Harvard Business Review (Jan/Feb): 71-79.
Kaplan, S. (1994), Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the US. Journal of Political Economy 102(3): 510-46.
Kaplan, S. (1994), Top executives, turnover and firm performance in Germany . Journal of Law, Economics & Organisation 10(1): 142-59.
Kato, T. (1997), CEO Compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New evidence from micro data. International Journal of Industrial Organisation 15(4): 493-510.
Kole, S. (1997), The complexity of compensation contracts. Journal of Financial Economics 43(1) 79-104.
Kostiuk, P. (1990), Firm size and executive compensation. Journal of Human Resources 25(1): 90-105.
Lambert, R. (1986), Executive effort and the selection of risky projects . Rand Journal of Economics 17(1), 77-88.
Lambert, R., W. Lanen & D. Larcker (1989), Executive stock option plans and corporate dividend policy. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis 24(4): 409-425.
Lambert, R. & D. Larcker (1988), An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25: 85-129.
Lazear, E. (1989), Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of Political Economy 97: 561-80.
Leonard, J. (1990), Executive pay and firm performance . Industrial & Labor Relations Review 43(3), 13-29.
Lewellen, W., C. Loderer & K. Martin (1987). Executive compensation and executive incentive problems: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting & Economics 9: 287-310.
Main, B. (1999), The rise and fall of executive share options in Britain, in J. Carpenter & D. Yermack eds., Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value: Theory and Evidence , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
Main, B., A. Bruce & T. Buck (1996), Total board remuneration and company performance. Economic Journal 106: 1627-1644.
Main, B. & J. Johnston (1993), Remuneration committees and corporate governance. Accounting & Business Research 23: 351-62.
Main, G., C. O’Reilly & G. Crystal (1994), Over here and over there: A comparison of top executive pay in the UK and USA. Contributions to Labour Studies 4: 115-127.
Main, G., C. O’Reilly & J. Wade (1995), The CEO, the board of directors and executive compensation: economic and psychological perspectives. Industrial & Corporate Change 11: 606-628.
Masson, R. (1971) Executive motivations, earnings and consequent equity performance. Journal of Political Economy 79(6): 1278-1292.
Mehran, H. (1995), Executive compensation structure, ownership and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38(2): 163-84.
Mehran, H., G. Nogler & K. Schwartz (1998), CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy. Journal of Financial Economics 50(3), 319-349.
Mirrlees, J. (1976), The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organisation. Rand Journal of Economics 7: 105-131.
Mookherjee, D. (1984), Optimal incentives with many agents. Review of Economic Studies 51(3): 433-446.
Murphy, K. (1985), Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting & Economics 7(1-3): 11-42.
Murphy, K. (1986), Incentives, learning and compensation: A theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 17(1): 59-76.
Murphy, K. (1995), Politics, economics and executive compensation . University of Cincinnati Law Review 63(2).
Murphy, K. (1998). Executive compensation and the modern industrial revolution. International Journal of industrial Organisation 15(4): 417-426.
O’Reilly, C., B. Main & G. Crystal (1988) CEO compensation as a tournament and social comparison: a tale of tow theories. Administrative Science Quarterly 33: 257-274.
Rosen, S. (1981), The economics of superstars. American Economic Review 71(5): 845-58.
Saly, J. (1994), Repricing executive stock options in a down market . Journal of Accounting & Economics 18(3), 325-356.
Sloan, R. (1993), Accounting earnings and top executive compensation . Journal of Accounting & Economics 16(1-3): 55-100.
Smith, C. & R. Watts (1992), The investment opportunity set, corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32(2): 263-92.
Tosi, H. & L. Gomez-Mejia (1989), The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly 34: 169-189.
Tosi, H. & L. Gomez-Mejia (1994), CEO compensation monitoring and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal 37(4): 1002-1016.
Weisbach, M. (1993), The CEO and the firm’s investment decisions . Journal of Financial Economics 37(2): 159-188.
Yermack, D. (1995), Do corporations award stock options effectively ? Journal of Financial Economics 39(2-3): 237-69.
Yermack, D. (1997), Good timing: CEO stock option awards and company news announcements. Journal of Finance 52(2): 449-476.
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